

## REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

B of T Report 5-I-19

Subject:      Restrictive Covenants of Large Health Care Systems

Presented by:    Jesse M. Ehrenfeld, MD, MPH, Chair

---

1      INTRODUCTION

2

3      At the 2019 Annual Meeting, the American Medical Association (AMA) House of Delegates  
4      (HOD) adopted Policy D-383.978, “Restrictive Covenants of Large Health Care Systems,”  
5      introduced by the Organized Medical Staff Section, which asked:

6

7      1. Our AMA, through its Organized Medical Staff Section will educate medical  
8      students, physicians-in-training, and physicians entering into employment contracts  
9      with large health care system employers on the dangers of aggressive restrictive  
10     covenants, including but not limited to the impact on patient choice and access to  
11     care.

12

13     2. Our AMA study the impact that restrictive covenants have across all practice  
14     settings, including but not limited to the effect on patient access to health care, the  
15     patient-physician relationship, and physician autonomy, with report back at the 2019  
16     Interim Meeting.

17

18     Testimony noted that this is a significant issue that is rarely looked at, that physicians often are not  
19     given a choice but to sign a covenant, and that students are rarely educated on the practice before  
20     entering the workforce. Speakers also testified that the practice has negative ramifications for rural  
21     medicine, and that physicians can be limited from even volunteering to practice in retirement due  
22     to restrictive covenants.

23

24     It should be noted that during the 2019 Annual Meeting, the HOD referred Resolution 010  
25     “Covenants not to Compete” to the AMA Board of Trustees. Resolution 010 asked our AMA to  
26     consider as the basis for model legislation the New Mexico statute allowing a requirement that  
27     liquidated damages be paid when a physician partner who is a part owner in practice is lured away  
28     by a competing hospital system. Resolution 010 also asked our AMA to ask our Council on Ethical  
29     and Judicial Affairs to reconsider their blanket opposition to covenants not to compete in the case  
30     of a physician partner who is a part owner of a practice, in light of the protection that liquidated  
31     damages can confer to independent physician owned partnerships, and because a requirement to  
32     pay liquidated damages does not preclude a physician from continuing to practice in his or her  
33     community. The AMA Board of Trustees will present the HOD with a report concerning  
34     Resolution 010 at the 2020 Annual Meeting.

35

36      DISCUSSION

37

38      Restrictive covenants, which often are included as part of a physician employment contract,  
39      typically prohibit physicians from practicing medicine within a specific geographic area and time  
40      after employment. For example, a restrictive covenant may prohibit the physician from practicing

1 medicine within 10 miles of the location where he or she treated patients for two years after  
2 employment has ended. With respect to geographic restrictions, physicians should be mindful that  
3 the geographic scope of a restrictive covenant can be greatly expanded if the covenant is tied to  
4 multiple locations where the employer furnishes health care services. For example, a restrictive  
5 covenant may prohibit the physician from practicing within 10 miles from *any* location where a  
6 large health care system provides patient care, regardless of whether the physician actually treated  
7 patients at a given location. If a large health care system furnishes health care services in multiple  
8 locations, the covenant could force the physician to move out of a city or even a state if he or she  
9 wanted to keep practicing medicine, which, in turn, may make the physician inaccessible to former  
10 patients.

11  
12 State law governs covenants, and states can vary widely in how they address them. Some states  
13 have statutes that regulate restrictive covenants, and some of those statutes prohibit restrictive  
14 covenant enforcement against employed physicians. California, Delaware, Massachusetts, New  
15 Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Rhode Island, for example, have enacted laws that would  
16 prohibit restrictive covenant enforcement against employed physicians.<sup>1</sup> Other states may deal with  
17 restrictive covenant issues solely through court cases. Absent a specific statute prohibiting the  
18 enforcement of a restrictive covenant, courts in most states will generally allow an employer to  
19 enforce a reasonable restrictive covenant against an employed physician, notwithstanding the  
20 concerns raised by Policy D-383.978.

21  
22 *Application to all care settings where restrictive covenants are concerned*  
23

24 Policy D-383.978 asks our AMA to “study the impact that restrictive covenants have across all  
25 practice settings....” This report primarily addresses restrictive covenant use in the large health  
26 care system environment. However, this report’s discussion about concerns associated with  
27 aggressive restrictive covenant enforcement will be applicable across all care settings, since those  
28 concerns may arise whenever an employer utilizes restrictive covenants, regardless of practice  
29 setting.

30  
31 *Restrictive covenants to protect legitimate business interests*  
32

33 A court will enforce a reasonable restrictive covenant in a physician employment agreement when  
34 it determines that the covenant is necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate business interest.  
35 With respect to physician employment, the legitimate business interest typically is the investment  
36 the employer has made in helping the physician establish his or her practice. A physician employer,  
37 e.g., a large health system, may spend thousands of dollars recruiting the physician, covering the  
38 physician’s relocation costs, training, providing administrative support and marketing the  
39 physician. The employer may also give the physician access to community referral sources, patient  
40 lists and propriety information. This investment will likely be more significant if the employer is  
41 recruiting the physician right out of residency. Given this resource commitment, the employer may  
42 think it necessary to protect its investment in the physician through a restrictive covenant that will  
43 prevent the physician from leaving and joining a rival health system, or otherwise competing with  
44 the former employer. Although aggressive enforcement of restrictive covenants can raise the issues  
45 identified in Policy D-383.978, restrictive covenants can benefit employed physicians. For  
46 example, a potential employer may be much less willing to make the time and resource  
47 commitments that are needed to help physicians succeed in medical practice without a restrictive  
48 covenant in place.

1     *Concerns that Policy D-383.978 identifies*

2  
3     As Policy D-383.978 notes, aggressive enforcement of restrictive covenants in physician  
4     employment contracts can trigger issues regarding the patient-physician relationship, access to  
5     health care, physician autonomy and patient choice. A restrictive covenant's application could, for  
6     example, negatively impact patient access to care by severing a long-standing patient-physician  
7     relationship, particularly in cases where the physician has been regularly and actively involved in  
8     helping the patient manage an ongoing mental or physical condition. If a restrictive covenant  
9     requires the physician to leave the area in order to continue practicing medicine, for example, the  
10    patient may not as a practical matter be able to continue seeing the physician. The result here  
11    would be an end to the patient-physician relationship and further, this could potentially hinder the  
12    patient's ability to manage his or her condition. Even assuming a smooth care transition to another  
13    physician, a significant amount of time might pass before this new patient-physician relationship  
14    enjoys the same level of trust and candor as the first.

15  
16    Aggressive enforcement of a restrictive covenant could also have negative consequences on patient  
17    care outside of a long-term patient-physician relationship. For example, depending on the  
18    geographic area, there may be just a few physicians, general practitioners or specialists, available to  
19    serve the needs of the patient population. This may be particularly true in rural parts of the country.  
20    Even if several physicians practice in the community, requiring a physician to leave the area may  
21    reduce the number of available physicians. Although a replacement physician may ultimately be  
22    brought to the area, recruitment can be a lengthy process. In fact, it may be quite a while before the  
23    replacement physician can start seeing the community's patients. In the meantime, the absence of  
24    the physician subject to the restrictive covenant could hinder patient access by increasing patient  
25    wait times—assuming the community's remaining physicians have the capacity to take on new  
26    patients. The situation could be compounded if the community has only one general practitioner or  
27    physician of a needed specialty. In that case, obligating a physician to leave the area could deny the  
28    community those medical services until a new physician could commence practice. In the interim,  
29    patients may have to decide whether they can travel to other communities to obtain those services,  
30    which may not always be practically feasible, or do without for the time being.

31  
32    As Policy D-383.978 notes, aggressive enforcement of restrictive covenants may also detrimentally  
33    impact a patient's choice of physician. Obviously, application of a restrictive covenant can  
34    negatively affect patient choice if the covenant obligates the patient's preferred physician to  
35    relocate to an area that is beyond the patient's practical reach. But patient choice could still be  
36    affected if his or her preferred physician moves to an area that the patient does not regard as  
37    geographically inaccessible, e.g., the patient places such a value on continuing the patient-  
38    physician relationship that he or she is willing and able to accept inconveniences that the  
39    physician's relocation may have created, such as increased travel distance. However,  
40    notwithstanding the patient's willingness, relocation may affect the physician's network status with  
41    respect to the patient's health insurance coverage or employee benefits plan. If the physician had  
42    been out-of-network previously, continued out-of-network status may have little impact on patient  
43    choice. But if the physician had been in-network, the increase in the patient's financial obligation  
44    to stay with the physician may compel the patient to select another, in-network, physician.

45  
46    Policy D-383.978 also identifies physician autonomy as a concern raised by aggressive restrictive  
47    covenants. AMA policy recognizes the importance of physician autonomy. For example, Policy  
48    H-225.950, "AMA Principles for Physician Employment," states in part that "[e]mployed  
49    physicians should be free to exercise their personal and professional judgment in voting, speaking,  
50    and advocating on any matter regarding patient care interests, the profession, health care in the  
  community, and the independent exercise of medical judgment." Further, according to

1 H-225.950, employed physicians should not be considered to have violated their employment  
2 agreements or suffer retaliation for exercising their personal and professional judgment.  
3 Notwithstanding H-225-950, if a physician knows that the culture of his or her employer is one of  
4 aggressive restrictive covenant enforcement, that knowledge may dampen the physician's  
5 willingness to freely and fully exercise his or her autonomy in patients' best interests. For example,  
6 typically a physician employment agreement will contain a "without cause" termination provision.  
7 This provision allows an employer to end the employment agreement so long as the employer gives  
8 the physician prior notice, e.g., 90 days. The physician need not have violated his or her agreement  
9 to be subject to "without cause" termination.<sup>2</sup> If the physician is concerned that his or her employer  
10 may end their employment under a "without cause" provision in retaliation for strong patient  
11 advocacy, for example, the physician may be reluctant to serve as a strong advocate. This may be  
12 especially true if the "without cause" termination also triggers the application of a restrictive  
13 covenant that may require the physician to move out of the community if the physician wanted to  
14 continue practicing medicine.

15  
16 *Potential difference between restrictive covenants in large health systems and independent*  
17 *physician practices*

18  
19 Although Resolution 26 addresses aggressive restrictive covenant enforcement by large health  
20 system employers, independent physician practices also use restrictive covenants. The concerns  
21 identified in Resolution 26 can apply equally across the board regardless of employer. There may,  
22 however, be cases where concerns about restrictive covenants may be greater when the employer is  
23 a large health system vis-à-vis a physician practice. One difference could be the extent to which a  
24 potential physician employee may be able to negotiate the scope and duration of a restrictive  
25 covenant. A large health system may be less inclined than, say, a small physician practice to  
26 negotiate the terms of a restrictive covenant or other conditions of employment, e.g., due to  
27 institutional policies. However, a physician should never be reluctant to voice his or her concerns  
28 about the impact that restrictive covenant language may have on physician autonomy or simply  
29 assume that a large health system will not negotiate restrictive covenant language to address those  
30 concerns. A large health system may, in fact, be amenable to negotiations depending on the  
31 circumstances, which may be highly fact-specific.

32  
33 Further, the culture of restrictive covenant structure and enforcement may differ between a large  
34 health system employer and an independent physician practice. Physicians frequently own and  
35 control independent practices, and thus decide how restrictive covenants will be drafted and  
36 enforced. Since physicians are in control, the structure and enforcement of restrictive covenants  
37 may be sensitive to the concerns raised by Policy D-383.978 In contrast, in large health systems,  
38 non-physicians may dictate how restrictive covenants are structured and enforced and may not be  
39 as cognizant of the issues identified in Policy D-383.978. It must, however, be emphasized that  
40 simply because a restrictive covenant is used within the context of a small physician practice does  
41 not mean that the scope and enforcement of the covenant does not exceed what is reasonable and  
42 does not implicate the concerns raised in Policy D-383.978. Furthermore, use of restrictive  
43 covenants by large health system employers may not always negatively impact patient access,  
44 choice and/or physician autonomy.

45  
46 Finally, a large health care system's aggressive enforcement of a restrictive covenant may have  
47 adverse consequences on network participation which do not often arise when an independent  
48 physician practice is involved. For example, in contrast to most independent physician practices,  
49 large health care systems may sponsor clinically integrated networks or accountable care  
50 organizations (ACOs). Some have also created affiliated health insurers. The system's aggressive  
51 enforcement of a restrictive covenant may trigger issues that Policy D-383.978 identifies if the

1 covenant would force the physician out of the system's clinically integrated network or ACO, or  
2 prohibit the physician from participating in the system's health insurance provider network. In  
3 some cases, the prospect of adverse network consequences may, in fact, concern the physician as  
4 much as the restrictive covenant itself.

5

## 6 AMA POLICY

7

8 Our AMA has several policies that address restrictive covenants. For example, CEJA Ethical  
9 Opinion 11.2.3.1, entitled "Restrictive Covenants" states that, "[c]ompetition among physicians is  
10 ethically justifiable when it is based on such factors as quality of services, skill, experience,  
11 conveniences offered to patients, fees, or credit terms." That Opinion also states that covenants-  
12 not-to-compete restrict competition, can disrupt continuity of care, and may limit access to care,  
13 and that physicians should not enter into covenants that: (a) unreasonably restrict the right of a  
14 physician to practice medicine for a specified period of time or in a specified geographic area on  
15 termination of a contractual relationship; and (b) do not make reasonable accommodation for  
16 patients' choice of physician. The Opinion further adds that physicians in training should not be  
17 asked to sign covenants not to compete as a condition of entry into any residency or fellowship  
18 program.

19

20 In addition to the CEJA Opinion, Policy H-310.929, "Principles for Graduate Medical Education,"  
21 states that restrictive covenants must not be required of residents or applicants for residency  
22 education; Policy H-295.910, "Restrictive Covenants During Training," strongly urges residency  
23 and fellowship training programs that utilize restrictive covenants to provide written intent to  
24 impose such restrictions in advance of the interview process; Policy H-295.901, "Restrictive  
25 Covenants in Residency and Fellowship Training Programs," states that physicians-in-training  
26 should not be asked to sign covenants not-to-compete as a condition of their entry into any  
27 residency or fellowship program; Policy H-225.950, "AMA Principles for Physician Employment,"  
28 discourages physicians from entering into agreements that restrict the physician's right to practice  
29 medicine for a specified period of time or in a specified area upon termination of employment; and  
30 Policy H-383.987, "Restrictive Covenants in Physician Contracts," states that "[o]ur AMA will  
31 provide guidance, consultation, and model legislation concerning the application of restrictive  
32 covenants to physicians upon request of state medical associations and national medical specialty  
33 societies."

34

## 35 SOME KEY POINTS AND AMA RESOURCES ON RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

36

37 As the prior discussion shows, physicians should very carefully scrutinize any restrictive covenant  
38 language in employment contract offers they receive. Obtaining the assistance of an attorney who  
39 has experience representing physicians in employment matters can be very helpful in determining  
40 whether proposed restrictive covenant language is reasonable and appropriate. Physicians should  
41 proactively bring any concerns they have about restrictive covenant language to the potential  
42 employer and should not be afraid to ask for changes.

43

44 The following are some key points that can help physicians evaluate the reasonableness of  
45 restrictive covenant language:

46

- 47 • what triggers the restrictive covenant, e.g., the employer's terminating the agreement for *any*  
48 reason as opposed to termination because the physician failed to live up to his or her contact  
49 obligations;
- 50 • the duration of the covenant, e.g., one year versus three years;

- 1     • the covenant's geographic scope, e.g., is it greater than what is necessary to protect the  
2       employer:  
3        ◦ for example, 10 miles might be reasonable in a rural area but may not be in an urban  
4           setting;  
5        ◦ for example, is geographic scope tied to an appropriate site of service, e.g., where the  
6           physician actually treated his or her patients or does the scope extend to *any* location where  
7           the employer has facilities;  
8     • does the covenant apply only to the services that the physician furnished, or does it prohibit the  
9           physician from practicing medicine entirely or from providing administrative services; and  
10     • does the covenant contain a reasonable "buy-out" provision that, if satisfied, would free the  
11       employed physician from time and geographic restrictions.

12  
13   Finally, it ought to be noted that the AMA has many resources that educate medical students,  
14   physicians-in-training, and physicians about restrictive covenants. For example:

- 15  
16     • The AMA Career Planning Resource webpage has a wealth of information discussing  
17       physician employment issues, which includes information and tips regarding  
18       restrictive covenants. The AMA Career Planning Resource webpage may be accessed  
19       at <https://www.ama-assn.org/residents-students/career-planning-resource/understanding-employment-contracts>.  
20  
21     • The AMA also has two model employment agreements that discuss restrictive  
22       covenants, the Annotated Model Physician-Hospital Employment Agreement, 2011  
23       edition: E-Book, free for AMA members at [https://commerce.ama-assn.org/store/ui/catalog/productDetail?product\\_id=prod1240028&sku\\_id=sku1240037](https://commerce.ama-assn.org/store/ui/catalog/productDetail?product_id=prod1240028&sku_id=sku1240037), and the Annotated Model Physician-Group Practice Employment Agreement: E-  
24       Book, free for members at [https://commerce.ama-assn.org/store/ui/catalog/productDetail?product\\_id=prod2530052&sku\\_id=sku2530104](https://commerce.ama-assn.org/store/ui/catalog/productDetail?product_id=prod2530052&sku_id=sku2530104). These agreements contain model restrictive covenant language for potential  
25       physician employees to consider, which may prove useful in the employment  
26       negotiation process.  
27  
28     • Finally, staff at the AMA Advocacy Resource Center, the state advocacy unit of the AMA,  
29       work extensively on physician employment issues. AMA members are encouraged to contact  
30       the Advocacy Resource Center at [arc@ama-assn.org](mailto:arc@ama-assn.org), if they would like to obtain more  
31       information and resources concerning restrictive covenants.  
32  
33  
34

## REFERENCES

<sup>1</sup> See Cal Bus & Prof Code § 16600; 6 Del. C. § 2707 (allows liquidated damages); ALM GL Ch. 112, § 12X; RSA 329:31-a; N.D. Cent. Code, § 9-08-06; 15 Okl. St. § 219A (so long as the employee does not solicit the former employer's customers); R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37-33.

<sup>2</sup> Frequently the agreement will (and should) contain a reciprocal "without cause" provision, meaning that the physician can also terminate the agreement if he or she gives the employer the same prior notice as the employer is obligated to provide the physician.