

REPORT 5 OF THE COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SERVICE (A-19)
The Impact of Pharmacy Benefit Managers on Patients and Physicians
(Reference Committee A)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the 2018 Annual Meeting, the House of Delegates adopted Policy D-120.933, “Pharmacy Benefit Managers Impact on Patients.” The Board of Trustees assigned the following provisions of the policy to the Council on Medical Service for a report back to the House of Delegates at the 2019 Annual Meeting:

Our American Medical Association (AMA) will: (1) gather more data on the erosion of physician-led medication therapy management in order to assess the impact pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) tactics may have on patient’s timely access to medications, patient outcomes, and the physician-patient relationship; and (2) examine issues with PBM-related clawbacks and direct and indirect remuneration (DIR) fees to better inform existing advocacy efforts.

PBMs no longer simply negotiate drug prices on behalf of their clients, but rather fully administer the drug benefit creating formularies, making coverage decisions, and determining medical necessity with utilization management tools. The Council believes that PBMs’ role managing drug benefits now resembles the typical role of insurers, and they should be treated as such by regulators. Overall, regulators must better understand and control the costs to patients and the systems that are resulting from PBM practices. As such, the Council recommends that PBMs be actively regulated under state departments of insurance. To implement this new policy, the Council believes that our AMA should develop model state legislation addressing state regulation of PBMs. On the federal level, the Council believes that PBMs, like health plans, should be subject to federal laws that prevent discrimination against patients, including those related to discriminatory benefit design and mental health and substance use disorder parity.

The Council recognizes that the negative fluidity of the drug benefit is largely a result of the rebate system and the constant negotiations that take place to advance the interests of many drug benefit stakeholders – but not patients. The Council is concerned that the rebate process results in list prices above what they would be absent rebates, as neither PBMs nor manufacturers currently have an incentive to lower list prices. As such, the Council questions whether rebates that are being negotiated by PBMs are resulting in any true savings. The disclosure of rebate and discount information, financial incentive information, and pharmacy and therapeutics (P&T) committee information would constitute critical steps toward improved transparency. The Council also believes that manufacturer rebates and pharmacy price concessions should be applied to drug prices at the point-of-sale. This policy, which also applies directly to DIR fees, would add much needed transparency and ensure that beneficiaries benefit from discounts, and dispensing physicians and practice-based pharmacies have more clarity regarding their true reimbursement rates.

In order to maintain cost transparency for patients and keep patients stable on their medications, the Council also recommends the reaffirmation of policies addressing mid-year formulary changes and utilization management requirements. These practices employed by PBMs can undermine the ability of patients to have timely access to the medically necessary treatment that they need.

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SERVICE

CMS Report 5-A-19

Subject: The Impact of Pharmacy Benefit Managers on Patients and Physicians

Presented by: James G. Hinsdale, MD, Chair

Referred to: Reference Committee A
(John Montgomery, MD, MPH, Chair)

1 At the 2018 Annual Meeting, the House of Delegates adopted Policy D-120.933, “Pharmacy
2 Benefit Managers Impact on Patients.” The Board of Trustees assigned the following provisions of
3 the policy to the Council on Medical Service for a report back to the House of Delegates at the
4 2019 Annual Meeting:

5
6 Our American Medical Association (AMA) will: (1) gather more data on the erosion of
7 physician-led medication therapy management in order to assess the impact pharmacy benefit
8 manager (PBM) tactics may have on patient’s timely access to medications, patient outcomes,
9 and the physician-patient relationship; and (2) examine issues with PBM-related clawbacks and
10 direct and indirect remuneration (DIR) fees to better inform existing advocacy efforts.

11
12 This report provides background on PBM operations and market conditions, outlines issues of
13 concern for patients and physicians with respect to PBM operations; and presents policy
14 recommendations.

15 16 BACKGROUND: PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGER OPERATIONS AND MARKET 17 CONDITIONS

18
19 PBMs represent payers, including health insurers and self-insured employers, to negotiate
20 discounts on the prices of prescription drugs and rebates based on volume of sales with
21 pharmaceutical companies. In turn, payers determine which drugs to cover and how much patients
22 pay. The role of PBMs as “middlemen” among payers, pharmaceutical companies and pharmacies
23 goes beyond the negotiation of drug prices on behalf of their clients. PBMs are more frequently
24 fully administering the drug benefit of their clients, creating formularies, making coverage
25 decisions, and determining medical necessity using utilization management tools. They also create
26 networks of pharmacies and negotiate reductions in dispensing fees.

27
28 In general, PBMs have three primary revenue sources:

- 29
30 1. Fees from payers for claims administration and drug dispensing;
- 31
32 2. A percentage of the savings secured from rebates and discounts negotiated from
33 pharmaceutical companies; and
- 34
35 3. Fees and savings associated with maintaining pharmacy networks.

1 The PBM market is highly concentrated: three PBMs – Express Scripts, CVS Caremark and
2 OptumRx – control more than 70 percent of the market.¹ These three PBMs, by representing so
3 many covered lives, have substantial bargaining power in their negotiations with drug
4 manufacturers. Complicating the market concentration is the trend toward PBMs merging with
5 health insurers, and how that could impact pharmacy networks available to patients. CVS-Aetna
6 announced their proposed merger in December of 2017. The US Department of Justice (DOJ) has
7 approved the CVS-Aetna merger, contingent on a federal court approving a settlement in which
8 Aetna has agreed to divest its Medicare Part D prescription drug plan business. At the time this
9 report was written, a federal court is reviewing that settlement. Cigna-Express Scripts announced
10 their intention to combine in March of 2018. The Cigna-Express Scripts merger has been approved
11 and is being consummated. Pertaining to PBM operations, the health insurers in these instances are
12 trying to merge with the entity that is providing them with PBM and pharmacy services. Concerns
13 have been raised by the AMA and others that the CVS-Aetna merger could substantially lessen
14 competition in PBM services, health insurance, retail pharmacy, Medicare Part D, and specialty
15 pharmacy.²

16

17 OPERATIONS OF PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: ISSUES OF CONCERN FOR 18 PATIENTS AND PHYSICIANS

19

20 *Insufficient Regulation*

21

22 While most states have laws that regulate various aspects of PBM operations, such laws are rather
23 limited in nature, and do not necessarily reflect the roles that PBMs have assumed in fully
24 administering the drug benefit of their clients. State laws that regulate aspects of PBM operations
25 generally fall into the following categories:

26

- 27 • Requiring a PBM to register with or be licensed by the state, in order to conduct business
28 in the state;
- 29 • Specifying pharmacy audit procedures by PBMs, including outlining audit appeals
30 mechanisms, audit notification requirements, how frequently audits can occur and what can
31 be audited;
- 32 • Outlining conflict of interest provisions with respect to pharmacy and therapeutics (P&T)
33 committees and other areas;
- 34 • Requiring transparency in the development and utilization of maximum allowable cost
35 (MAC) lists, which list the maximum amount a PBM will pay for drugs;
- 36 • Prohibiting “gag clauses” in PBM-pharmacy contracts;
- 37 • Enacting “anti co-pay clawback” provisions that aim to prevent patient co-payments from
38 exceeding the full cost of the drug;
- 39 • Imposing a fiduciary duty on a PBM to the entity with which it contracts; and
- 40 • Imposing a performance duty on a PBM, which requires a PBM to operate in good faith
41 with the entity with which it contracts.

42

43 On the federal level, the function PBMs have assumed in administering the drug benefit of their
44 clients raise the issue of if, and to what extent, PBMs are currently subject to federal laws that
45 prevent discrimination against patients, including those related to discriminatory benefit design and
46 mental health and substance use disorder parity. Concerns have been raised that clarity is needed in
47 this regard, as while they are not a health plan, they are operating very much like one pertaining to
48 drug benefits.

1 AMA Policy and Advocacy Regarding Regulation

2
 3 Policy D-185.995 puts PBMs on the same footing as public and private sector payers, by stating
 4 that our AMA will (1) advocate our policies related to health plan coverage of prescription drugs to
 5 PBMs, as well as to public and private sector payers; and (2) advocate for the enactment of
 6 legislation consistent with AMA policies related to health plan coverage of prescription drugs.
 7 Accordingly, the multitude of AMA policies addressing formulary requirements and transparency,
 8 utilization management, mental health parity and other issues are applicable to PBMs in addition to
 9 health plans.

10
 11 Policy H-125.986 provides significant guidance with respect to federal regulation of PBM
 12 operations. The policy: 1) encourages the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Food and Drug
 13 Administration (FDA) to continue monitoring the relationships between pharmaceutical
 14 manufacturers and PBMs, especially with regard to manufacturers' influences on PBM drug
 15 formularies and drug product switching programs, and to take enforcement actions as appropriate;
 16 2) states that certain actions/activities by PBMs and others constitute the practice of medicine
 17 without a license and interfere with appropriate medical care to our patients; 3) supports efforts to
 18 ensure that reimbursement policies established by PBMs are based on medical need; these policies
 19 include, but are not limited to, prior authorization, formularies, and tiers for compounded
 20 medications; and 4) encourages the FTC and FDA to monitor PBMs' policies for potential conflicts
 21 of interest and anti-trust violations, and to take appropriate enforcement actions should those
 22 policies advantage pharmacies in which the PBM holds an economic interest.

23
 24 In its comments in response to the *American Patients First, The Trump Administration Blueprint*
 25 *to Lower Drug Prices and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Costs (Blueprint)* in July of 2018, the AMA
 26 outlined its support for regulating PBMs, stating that the benefit management of PBMs now
 27 resembles the typical role of insurers, and they should be treated as such by regulators. Also in
 28 July, the AMA submitted a letter in support of the efforts of the National Council of Insurance
 29 Legislators (NCOIL) in developing a draft state model act to require licensure of PBMs in the state
 30 and allow for oversight by the department of insurance or other equivalent regulatory agency.
 31 Additionally, the AMA has advocated for the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
 32 (NAIC) to include in its pharmacy benefit model legislation the regulation of PBM activities.

33
 34 *Lack of Transparency*

35
 36 The Council recognizes that the ability of patients and physicians to have the information they
 37 need to make key decisions regarding medication, and of policymakers to craft viable solutions
 38 to high and escalating pharmaceutical costs, has been hampered by the often byzantine and
 39 confidential arrangements that are driving increased medication prices without a clear and
 40 justifiable reason. The opaque nature of PBM negotiations of drug prices has raised questions
 41 whether the rebate process results in list prices above what they would be absent rebates, as neither
 42 PBMs nor drug manufacturers currently have an incentive to lower list prices. In addition, there is a
 43 lack of transparency regarding what percent of the savings associated with rebates are passed
 44 through to patients or payers. The degree to which savings are passed on to payers and patients
 45 impacts health plan premiums as well as cost-sharing requirements.

46
 47 Concerns have also been raised by physicians and their patients pertaining to transparency in
 48 formularies, prescription drug cost-sharing requirements, and utilization management requirements.
 49 This lack of transparency makes it exceedingly difficult for physicians to determine what
 50 treatments are preferred by a particular payer at the point-of-care, what level of cost-sharing their
 51 patients will face, and whether medications are subject to any step therapy or other utilization

1 management requirements. For patients, lack of transparency in their drug coverage may lead to
 2 delays in necessary medication treatment, as well as being unaware of their formulary and cost-
 3 sharing responsibilities, which can lead to an inability to afford the medications they need. Such
 4 lack of transparency is exacerbated when formularies are changed mid-year, which can have
 5 negative effects on patients and can have a major impact on health care costs. Actions of PBMs to
 6 remove a medication from a patient’s formulary during the middle of the plan year and replace it
 7 with another medication that is not effective for the patient – or which the patient has previously
 8 tried and not done well on – could result in potential trips to the emergency room and/or
 9 hospitalizations, increased out-of-pocket costs if the patient is responsible for paying for the drug,
 10 and potential physician and patient resources spent on appeals and alternative solutions.

11
 12 AMA Policy and Advocacy regarding Transparency

13
 14 The AMA has been highly engaged in efforts to promote the transparency of PBM practices and
 15 operations, resulting from the adoption of Policy H-110.987, which encourages prescription drug
 16 price and cost transparency among pharmaceutical companies, PBMs and health insurance
 17 companies. Addressing mid-year formulary changes specifically, Policy H-125.979 states that
 18 drugs may not be removed from the formulary nor moved to a higher cost tier within a patient’s
 19 health plan policy term. To expose the opaque process that pharmaceutical companies, PBMs, and
 20 health insurers engage in when pricing prescription drugs and to rally grassroots support to call on
 21 lawmakers to demand transparency, the AMA launched a grassroots campaign and website,
 22 TruthinRx.org, in 2016. At the time this report was written, more than 338,000 individuals have
 23 signed a petition to members of Congress in support of greater drug pricing transparency, with the
 24 campaign also generating more than one million messages sent to Congress demanding drug price
 25 transparency.

26
 27 PBM transparency has also been a key theme highlighted in federal advocacy efforts related to
 28 drug pricing. In its comments in response to the proposed rule *Removal of Safe Harbor Protections*
 29 *for Rebates Involving Prescription Pharmaceuticals and Creation of a New Safe Harbor*
 30 *Protection for Certain Point-Of-Sale Reductions in Price on Prescription Pharmaceuticals and*
 31 *Certain Pharmacy Benefit Manager Service Fees* in April 2019, the AMA supported applying
 32 manufacturer rebates and pharmacy price concessions to drug prices at the point-of-sale, and
 33 requiring PBMs to disclose a wide range of information, including additional information about
 34 their fee arrangements. In its statement for the record to the US House of Representatives
 35 Committee on Oversight and Reform on examining the actions of drug companies in raising
 36 prescription drug prices in January 2019, the AMA supported requiring PBMs to apply
 37 manufacturer rebates and pharmacy price concessions to drug prices at the point-of-sale to ensure
 38 that patients benefit from discounts as well as eliminate some incentives for higher drug list prices;
 39 requiring increased transparency in formularies, prescription drug cost-sharing, and utilization
 40 management requirements for patients and physicians at the point-of-prescribing as well as when
 41 beneficiaries make annual enrollment elections; and prohibiting removal of drugs from a formulary
 42 or moving to a higher cost tier during the duration of the patient’s plan year unless a change is
 43 made for safety reasons. These concerns were echoed in the comments of the AMA submitted in
 44 response to *American Patients First, The Trump Administration Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices*
 45 *and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Costs (Blueprint)* in July 2018.

46
 47 In addition, in August 2018, the AMA submitted a letter in support of S 2554, the “Patient Right to
 48 Know Drug Prices Act,” which has since become law. The law prohibits health insurers and PBMs
 49 from using “gag clauses” that prevent pharmacists from sharing with patients the lower cost
 50 options when patients are purchasing medically necessary medication. In addition, the law will
 51 ensure that the FTC will have the necessary authorities to combat anti-competitive pay-for-delay

1 settlement agreements between manufacturers of biological reference products and follow-on
 2 biologicals.

3
 4 In March 2019, the AMA submitted a letter that supported HR 1781, the Payment Commission
 5 Data Act of 2019. If enacted into law, the bill would provide access to essential data that the
 6 Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and
 7 Access Commission (MACPAC) need to evaluate the practices of various entities within the
 8 pharmaceutical supply chain that are either not readily available or not available at all for
 9 independent analysis, including drug pricing and rebate data. In its letter, the AMA noted that the
 10 lack of independent, data driven, third-party analysis of drug pricing and rebate data continues to
 11 hamstring additional efforts needed to combat anti-competitive business practices that undermine
 12 affordability and harm patients.

13
 14 Concerning state-level advocacy, the AMA developed model state legislation entitled, “An Act to
 15 Increase Drug Cost Transparency and Protect Patients from Surprise Drug Cost Increases during
 16 the Plan Year” (AMA Model Act), which addresses the issues of stabilized formularies and cost
 17 transparency. In particular, the AMA Model Act requires PBMs operating in the state to disclose
 18 any discounts or other financial consideration they received that affect the price and cost-sharing of
 19 covered medicines placed on a formulary. In addition, the AMA has model state legislation that
 20 prohibits clawbacks and standard gag clauses in pharmacy-PBM contracts.

21
 22 *PBM Clawbacks and Direct and Indirect Remuneration Fees*

23
 24 DIR is a term used by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to refer to
 25 compensation Medicare Part D plan sponsors or their PBMs receive after the point-of-sale,
 26 including rebates provided by drug manufacturers and concessions paid by pharmacies.
 27 Concessions paid by pharmacies – which can include dispensing physicians and practice-based
 28 pharmacies – can comprise of network participation fees and reimbursement reconciliations. Such
 29 additional compensation after the point-of-sale, therefore, changes the final cost of drugs for
 30 payers, or the prices paid to pharmacies for drugs. In Part D, DIR impacts Medicare payments to
 31 Part D plans. However, DIR fees or similar fee mechanisms are being used in the commercial
 32 marketplace as well.

33
 34 The concern raised in Policy D-120.933, was directed not toward the role of DIR in capturing
 35 rebates from pharmaceutical companies, but the impact of DIR fees on pharmacies. The Council
 36 recognizes that such fees have negatively impacted some physicians who conduct in-office
 37 dispensing and/or have practice-based pharmacies. If DIR fees are not collected from pharmacies
 38 on a real-time basis, but rather after transactions take place, pharmacies and affected physician
 39 specialties have raised concerns that there exists a lack of clarity regarding their true
 40 reimbursement rates. In addition, such entities have cited a need for additional transparency
 41 regarding how DIRs are determined and calculated.

42
 43 In November 2018, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services issued a proposed rule,
 44 “Modernizing Part D and Medicare Advantage to Lower Drug Prices and Reduce Out-of-Pocket
 45 Expenses,” that contains potential policy recommendations that would respond to the concerns
 46 raised in Resolution 225-A-18 concerning the impact of DIR fees on pharmacies. The proposed
 47 rule considers having DIR fees be accounted for and applied at the point-of-sale, which impacts the
 48 predictability of pharmacy reimbursement rates as well as patient cost-sharing.³

1 AMA Policy and Advocacy regarding Clawbacks and DIR Fees

2
 3 Policy H-110.991 states that our AMA will disseminate model state legislation to promote
 4 increased drug price and cost transparency and to prohibit “clawbacks” and standard gag clauses in
 5 contracts between pharmacies and PBMs that bar pharmacists from telling consumers about less-
 6 expensive options for purchasing their medication. Accordingly, in January 2019, the AMA
 7 submitted comments in response to the *Modernizing Part D and Medicare Advantage to Lower*
 8 *Drug Prices and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Expenses* proposed rule. In its comments, the AMA
 9 supported the proposed changes to the definition of “negotiated price” and other related changes
 10 that were outlined to ensure reduction in cost burden by beneficiaries at the point-of-sale for Part D
 11 prescription drugs, increased transparency, and enhanced competition among Part D plan sponsors.
 12 Further, the AMA noted that “when all pharmacy price concessions are not reflected in the price of
 13 a drug at the point-of-sale, beneficiaries do not benefit through a reduction in the amount that they
 14 must pay in cost-sharing and pay a larger share of the actual cost of a drug.”

15
 16 *Utilization Management Requirements*

17
 18 When PBMs administer the drug benefits of payers, they have the ability to make coverage
 19 decisions and implement utilization management requirements that interfere with patients receiving
 20 the optimal treatment selected in consultation with their physicians. At the very least, utilization
 21 management requirements can delay access to needed care; in some cases, the barriers to care
 22 imposed by prior authorization and step therapy may lead to the patient receiving less effective
 23 therapy, no treatment at all, or even potentially harmful therapies. For physician practices,
 24 utilization management requirements often involve very manual, time-consuming processes that
 25 can divert valuable and scarce physician resources away from direct patient care.

26
 27 The 2018 AMA Prior Authorization Physician Survey provides insight into the impact that PBM
 28 utilization management requirements can have on patients and physician practices. In response to
 29 the survey, more than nine in 10 physicians (91 percent) responded that the prior authorization
 30 process delays patient access to necessary care, and three-quarters of physicians (75 percent) report
 31 that prior authorization can at least sometimes lead to patients abandoning a recommended course
 32 of treatment. In addition, more than nine in 10 physicians (91 percent) reported that prior
 33 authorization programs have a negative impact on patient clinical outcomes. Of significant
 34 concern, 28 percent of physicians reported that prior authorization led to a serious adverse event for
 35 a patient in their care. The survey findings also showed that every week, a medical practice
 36 completes an average of 31 prior authorization requirements per physician, which take the
 37 equivalent of nearly two business days (14.9 hours) of physician and staff time to complete. To
 38 keep up with the administrative burden, more than a third of physicians (36 percent) employ staff
 39 members who work exclusively on tasks associated with prior authorization.⁴

40
 41 In addition, a US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General
 42 (OIG) review of Medicare Advantage service denials in 2014-2016 reinforces the point that
 43 utilization management requirements can prevent patients from receiving medically necessary care.
 44 The OIG found that more than 116,800 prior authorization requests that were initially denied were
 45 eventually overturned on appeal. These overturned denials represent specific drugs/services that
 46 were medically necessary and the patient needed the treatment. The Council notes that this figure is
 47 particularly concerning because beneficiaries and providers appealed only one percent of denials.⁵

1 AMA Policy and Advocacy regarding Utilization Management Requirements

2
3 Policy H-320.939 supports efforts to track and quantify the impact of health plans' prior
4 authorization and utilization management processes on patient access to necessary care and patient
5 clinical outcomes, including the extent to which these processes contribute to patient harm. Policy
6 H-285.965 outlines AMA policy objectives addressing managed care cost containment involving
7 prescription drugs. Policy D-330.910 states that our AMA will explore problems with prescription
8 drug plans, including issues related to continuity of care, prior authorization, and formularies, and
9 work with the CMS and other appropriate organizations to resolve them. Policy H-320.958 states
10 that our AMA will advocate strongly for utilization management and quality assessment programs
11 that are non-intrusive, have reduced administrative burdens, and allow for adequate input by the
12 medical profession.

13
14 To educate the general public about the problems associated with prior authorization and to gather
15 stories from physicians and patients about how they have been affected by it, the AMA launched a
16 grassroots website, FixPriorAuth.org, in July 2018. At the time that this report was written, there
17 have been 10 million social media impressions, more than 500 patient and physician stories have
18 been captured, and approximately 90,000 petitions have been signed.

19
20 In addition, the AMA has been very active in advocating for a reduction in both the number of
21 physicians subjected to prior authorization and the overall volume of prior authorizations. In
22 January 2017, the AMA and a coalition of state and specialty medical societies, national provider
23 associations, and patient organizations developed and released a set of 21 Prior Authorization and
24 Utilization Management Reform Principles intended to ensure that patients receive timely and
25 medically necessary care and medications and reduce the administrative burdens. More than 100
26 other health care organizations have supported those principles. In January 2018, the AMA joined
27 the American Hospital Association, America's Health Insurance Plans, American Pharmacists
28 Association, Blue Cross Blue Shield Association and Medical Group Management Association in a
29 Consensus Statement outlining a shared commitment to industry-wide improvements to prior
30 authorization processes and patient-centered care. Additionally, the AMA has model legislation
31 addressing prior authorization and utilization management programs that are often employed by
32 PBMs, and works closely with many state and specialty medical societies to enact legislation each
33 year.

34
35 Concerning federal advocacy, the AMA submitted comments in response to the *Modernizing Part*
36 *D and Medicare Advantage to Lower Drug Prices and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Expenses* proposed
37 rule, and raised significant concerns with the proposal to allow Part D plans to apply more prior
38 authorization and step therapy requirements to protected class drugs. In its comments submitted in
39 November 2018 in response to the proposed rule to modify Medicare regulations to promote
40 program efficiency, transparency, and burden, the AMA urged CMS to reinstate its 2012 policy
41 prohibiting Medicare Advantage plans from using step-therapy protocols for Part B physician-
42 administered medications; and to carefully consider the care delays associated with prior
43 authorization and the resulting impact on beneficiaries and their health and well-being when
44 evaluating any additional prior authorization requirements for the Medicare program.

45
46 DISCUSSION

47
48 The Council recognizes that PBMs no longer simply negotiate drug prices on behalf of their
49 clients, but rather fully administer the drug benefit creating formularies, making coverage
50 decisions, and determining medical necessity with utilization management tools. The Council
51 believes that PBMs' role managing drug benefits now resembles the typical role of insurers, and

1 they should be treated as such by regulators. Overall, regulators must better understand and control
2 the costs to patients and the systems that are resulting from PBM practices. As such, the Council
3 recommends that PBMs be actively regulated under state departments of insurance. To implement
4 this new policy, the Council believes that our AMA should develop model state legislation
5 addressing state regulation of PBMs. On the federal level, the Council believes that PBMs, like
6 health plans, should be subject to federal laws that prevent discrimination against patients,
7 including those related to discriminatory benefit design and mental health and substance use
8 disorder parity.

9
10 The Council recognizes that the negative fluidity of the drug benefit is largely a result of the rebate
11 system and the constant negotiations that take place to advance the interests of many drug benefit
12 stakeholders – but not patients. The Council is concerned that the rebate process results in list
13 prices above what they would be absent rebates, as neither PBMs nor manufacturers currently have
14 an incentive to lower list prices. As such, the Council questions whether rebates that are being
15 negotiated by PBMs are resulting in any true savings. Moreover, the Council notes there is
16 insufficient evidence regarding what percent of the savings associated with rebates are being
17 passed through to patients or to payers.

18
19 To improve transparency in this space, the disclosure of rebate and discount information, financial
20 incentive information, and P&T committee information would constitute critical steps forward. The
21 Council also believes that manufacturer rebates and pharmacy price concessions should be applied
22 to drug prices at the point-of-sale. This policy, which also applies directly to DIR fees, would add
23 much needed transparency and ensure that beneficiaries benefit from discounts, and dispensing
24 physicians and practice-based pharmacies have more clarity regarding their true reimbursement
25 rates. As these policy changes are implemented, the Council believes that it will be essential to
26 monitor their impact on premiums, medication list prices, and the discount/rebate structure.

27
28 In order to maintain cost transparency for patients and keep patients stable on their medications,
29 the Council urges improved transparency in formularies, prescription drug cost-sharing, and
30 utilization management requirements. Requirements and restrictions should be easily
31 accessible by patients and prescribers and unless a change is made for safety reasons, PBMs and
32 health plans should be prohibited from making changes during the duration of the patient's plan
33 year. As such, the Council recommends the reaffirmation of Policy H-125.979.

34
35 Utilization management practices employed by PBMs can undermine the ability of patients to have
36 timely access to the medically necessary treatment that they need. The Council notes that
37 reaffirming existing AMA policies helps to highlight the need for new and additional efforts to
38 track and quantify the impact of PBMs' prior authorization and utilization management processes
39 on patient access to necessary care and patient clinical outcomes, including the extent to which
40 these processes contribute to patient harm. Existing AMA policies also aim to protect patients in
41 managed care cost containment practices involving prescription drugs, and state that our AMA will
42 explore problems with prescription drug plans, including issues related to continuity of care, prior
43 authorization, and formularies, and work with the CMS and other appropriate organizations to
44 resolve them.

1 RECOMMENDATIONS

2
3 The Council on Medical Service recommends that the following be adopted and that the remainder
4 of the report be filed:

- 5
6 1. That our American Medical Association (AMA) support the active regulation of pharmacy
7 benefit managers (PBMs) under state departments of insurance. (New HOD Policy)
8
9 2. That our AMA develop model state legislation addressing the state regulation of PBMs, which
10 shall include provisions to maximize the number of PBMs under state regulatory oversight.
11 (Directive to Take Action)
12
13 3. That our AMA support requiring the application of manufacturer rebates and pharmacy price
14 concessions, including direct and indirect remuneration (DIR) fees, to drug prices at the point-
15 of-sale. (New HOD Policy)
16
17 4. That our AMA support efforts to ensure that PBMs are subject to state and federal laws that
18 prevent discrimination against patients, including those related to discriminatory benefit design
19 and mental health and substance use disorder parity. (New HOD Policy)
20
21 5. That our AMA support improved transparency of PBM operations, including disclosing:
22
23 • Utilization information;
24 • Rebate and discount information;
25 • Financial incentive information;
26 • Pharmacy and therapeutics (P&T) committee information, including records describing
27 why a medication is chosen for or removed in the P&T committee's formulary,
28 whether P&T committee members have a financial or other conflict of interest, and
29 decisions related to tiering, prior authorization and step therapy;
30 • Formulary information, specifically information as to whether certain drugs are
31 preferred over others and patient cost-sharing responsibilities, made available to
32 patients and to prescribers at the point-of-care in electronic health records;
33 • Methodology and sources utilized to determine drug classification and multiple source
34 generic pricing; and
35 • Percentage of sole source contracts awarded annually. (New HOD Policy)
36
37 6. That our AMA encourage increased transparency in how DIR fees are determined and
38 calculated. (New HOD Policy)
39
40 7. That our AMA reaffirm Policy H-125.979, which aims to prohibit drugs from being removed
41 from the formulary or moved to a higher cost tier during the duration of the patient's plan year.
42 (Reaffirm HOD Policy)
43
44 8. That our AMA reaffirm Policy H-320.939, which supports efforts to track and quantify the
45 impact of health plans' prior authorization and utilization management processes on patient
46 access to necessary care and patient clinical outcomes, including the extent to which these
47 processes contribute to patient harm. (Reaffirm HOD Policy)
48
49 9. That our AMA reaffirm Policy H-285.965, which outlines AMA policy objectives addressing
50 managed care cost containment involving prescription drugs. (Reaffirm HOD Policy)

- 1 10. That our AMA reaffirm Policy D-330.910, which states that our AMA will explore problems
2 with prescription drug plans, including issues related to continuity of care, prior authorization,
3 and formularies, and work with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and other
4 appropriate organizations to resolve them. (Reaffirm HOD Policy)
5
- 6 11. That our AMA reaffirm Policy H-320.958, which states that our AMA will advocate strongly
7 for utilization management and quality assessment programs that are non-intrusive, have
8 reduced administrative burdens, and allow for adequate input by the medical profession.
9 (Reaffirm HOD Policy)

Fiscal Note: Less than \$500.

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