

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH

CSAPH Report 5-A-13

Subject: Health Effects of the Gulf Oil Spill

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Referred to: Reference Committee D
(Douglas W. Martin, MD, Chair)

1 INTRODUCTION

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3 At the 2010 Interim Meeting, the Council on Science and Public Health developed a brief report on
4 contemporary views regarding health risks associated with the Gulf oil spill and summarized
5 relevant activities of the American Medical Association.¹ Policy D-135.980, “Gulf Oil Spill Health
6 Risks: Update on AMA Involvement,” directs the Council to report back at the 2013 Annual
7 Meeting on the results of studies examining the health effects of the Gulf oil spill.

9 METHODS

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11 English-language reports were selected from a PubMed search of the literature from April 2010 to
12 March 2013 using the search terms, “gulf oil spill,” “deepwater horizon,” and “macondo,” alone
13 and combined with “health,” or “health effects.” Additional studies and resources were identified
14 from the reference list of materials reviewed. Additionally, relevant webpages of the U.S.
15 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Gulf of Mexico
16 Research Initiative, and National Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) were consulted for
17 information.

19 BACKGROUND

20
21 The Deepwater Horizon disaster began on April 20, 2010 with a blowout of British Petroleum
22 (BP) Exploration and Production Inc.’s Macondo well located ~1500 m deep and 84 km from
23 Venice, Louisiana, continuing until the well was successfully capped 87 days later. This spill was
24 unique in its magnitude, duration, location (deep sea floor) and how it was managed, including the
25 use of subsurface dispersants and controlled surface burns.²

27 OIL SPILL DYNAMICS

28
29 Human and ecological effects of the oil spill are directly related to rate and the quantity of oil and
30 gas/hydrocarbon mixture released and dispersants that were used. The oil flow rate was eventually
31 estimated at ~50,000-70,000 barrels per day, modestly decreasing over the duration of the spill for
32 a total of almost 5 million barrels (or > 200 million gallons).³ When an oil spill occurs underwater,
33 plumes of oil droplets are formed that drift toward the ocean’s surface. Surface slicks undergo
34 “weathering” through various processes including evaporation, emulsification, dispersion,
35 dissolution, sinking/sedimentation, biodegradation (microbial), and photo-oxidation.

Action of the AMA House of Delegates 2013 Annual Meeting: Recommendations in Report 5 of the Council on Science and Public Health Recommendations Adopted as Amended, and Remainder of Report filed.

1 Approximately 25% of the oil was removed or recovered via direct recapture from the riser pipe,
2 burning, or skimming, primarily in offshore waters north of the wellhead.⁴ Because of the
3 characteristics of the Macondo oil (i.e., relatively light crude, enriched in low molecular weight
4 compounds) and physical extremes of pressure and temperature at the well head, a substantial
5 portion of the oil (23%) was physically dispersed/dissolved or evaporated on reaching the surface.
6 Additionally, approximately 16% was chemically dispersed and 13% was degraded/consumed by
7 bacteria. Little or no methane gas reached the ocean surface.⁵ The remainder of the oil (~23%) is
8 unaccounted for. This category includes tar balls, and oil on beaches or in shallow subsurface mats
9 and deep sea sediments.³

10
11 A significant portion of the oil that was dispersed (chemically and naturally) was consumed by
12 bacteria that had evolved in deep Gulf waters where oil seeps are common.⁶ In the initial stages of
13 May and June 2010, microbial community composition in the plume waters expanded and was
14 highly enriched with previously uncharacterized oil-eating microbes capable of hydrocarbon and
15 alkane degradation.⁷ Beds of microbial proliferation, oil consumption, bacterial secretions and
16 subsequent death of microorganisms and/or plankton created dense accumulations (“marine snow”)
17 comprising oily particulate matter and creating ocean floor sediment that may be several inches
18 thick.⁸ By August 2010, oil had dissipated to background levels offshore, but grounded oil
19 remained in both deepwater and many shallow coastal areas around oiled marshes and near some
20 beaches, potentially affecting some deep coral communities, shore birds, oysters, and sea turtles in
21 particular.^{2,9,10}

22 23 *Use of Dispersants*

24
25 Dispersants are a mix of solvents, surfactants, and additives used to facilitate the breakup of oil into
26 tiny droplets that are more easily broken down by natural processes. Approximately 1.8 million
27 gallons of dispersant (primarily Corexit® 9500) were applied during the Deepwater Horizon
28 incident. More than 40% of this volume was applied directly at the wellhead more than 5,000 feet
29 below the ocean’s surface, a technique that had not been used before. This use was intended to
30 promote more rapid degradation of hydrocarbons, eventually doubling the amount of chemically-
31 dispersed oil from approximately 8% to 16%. An unknown portion of the dispersant remained
32 associated with the oil and gas phases of the underwater plume, apparently undergoing only
33 negligible or slow rates of biodegradation.¹¹

34
35 The material data safety sheet for Corexit® 9500 identifies light petroleum distillates (10-30%),
36 propylene glycol (1-5%) and organic sulfonic acid salt (10-30%) as hazardous substances.¹² The
37 proprietary sulfonic acid derivative was later identified as dioctyl sodium sulfosuccinate, a
38 commonly used stool softener for human use. Most water and sediment samples from near shore
39 and offshore that were tested for major dispersant constituents did not exceed EPA’s benchmark
40 threshold for aquatic safety.^{13,14} Although the toxicity of crude oil alone was comparable to the
41 toxicity of oil-dispersant mixtures in limited aquatic species testing,¹⁵ the long term implications
42 and toxicity of dispersant-oil mixtures on myriad ocean species are largely unknown. Additional
43 information is needed to better understand the risks of widespread dispersant use, especially
44 subsurface application. See the Government Accountability Office report on oil dispersants for
45 more discussion on the potential toxicity of oil dispersants and contemporary issues surrounding
46 their use.¹⁶

47 48 **SEAFOOD SAFETY**

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1 In recent years approximately 20% of the commercial seafood caught in U.S. waters came from the
2 Gulf of Mexico.¹⁷ During an oil spill, the National Oceanic and Aeronautic Administration
3 (NOAA) has authority to close (and with the concurrence of the FDA, open) federal fishing waters
4 (3-200 miles offshore), while states regulate fisheries in their costal waters (0-3 miles offshore). Of
5 greatest concern from the crude oil spill was exposure to higher molecular weight polycyclic
6 aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) and perhaps certain dispersant constituents. This concern was based
7 on the capacity of these substances for environmental persistence, bioactivity and/or human
8 toxicity. PAHs can potentially cause skin and lung cancer and are reproductive and developmental
9 toxins. Susceptibility of marine life to potential harmful effects is influenced by differential rates of
10 metabolism and disposition of PAHs. Finfish are least susceptible due to their high capacity to
11 eliminate PAHs. Crustaceans are somewhat intermediate in their metabolic efficiency, while
12 oysters have only a very limited ability to eliminate PAHs and thus are most susceptible to
13 accumulation and toxicity.¹⁸

14
15 At its peak, more than one-third of federal waters were closed to fishing, as were most state waters
16 extending from Louisiana to the panhandle of Florida. Reopening of federal waters required an oil
17 free period of 30 days and repeated tests on different types of seafood sampled over multiple days
18 based on a unified protocol involving sensory (smell) testing coupled with chemical analysis of 13
19 different PAHs and their alkylated homologs.¹⁹ The FDA estimated allowable thresholds (levels of
20 concern or LOC) for PAHs intended to be protective of vulnerable populations. The risk
21 assessment criteria differed for individual PAHs; some were based on a 5 year exposure for
22 carcinogenic endpoints; others were based on a lifetime exposure estimate (noncarcinogenic
23 endpoint). Sensory and chemical methods applied to >8,000 seafood specimens collected in federal
24 waters of the Gulf found only low concentrations of PAHs, at least two orders of magnitude below
25 levels of concern for human health based on the derived LOCs.²⁰ The assumptions used to create
26 the FDA model have been criticized as not sufficiently protective of vulnerable populations (see
27 Rotkin-Ellman et al).²¹ Ultimately, by April 2011 all federal fishing waters were reopened. It is
28 generally believed that these measures prevented oil-contaminated seafood from reaching the
29 market.²² Catastrophic losses of finfish populations in direct response to the oil spill itself were not
30 observed.²³

31 32 HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS

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34 Human health effects can be divided into those caused by chemical exposures and mental health
35 consequences. Exposed populations include more than 100,000 workers employed during the clean
36 up phase and community members with potential chemical exposures. Exposure routes include
37 inhalation, dermal contact, ingestion of contaminated food or water, and contact with beach and
38 soil residues.

39 40 *Workers with Chemical Exposures*

41
42 Worker exposure varied based on job assignment, training, and whether protective equipment was
43 used effectively. Exposures were both offshore (booming and skimming; aerial and vessel
44 dispersant release; in situ surface burning; containment and recovery work at the oil source) and
45 onshore (beach and wildlife cleanup operations, decontamination and waste management
46 activities). The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) catalogued a number
47 of reported symptoms in workers including headaches, faintness, dizziness, or weakness, eye, nose,
48 and throat irritation, lower respiratory symptoms, nausea and vomiting, and skin symptoms (itchy
49 or red skin, or rash). Air sampling around off shore activities were unremarkable, and reported
50 symptoms were considerably more prevalent in onshore work environments. For a summary of

1 these findings see the final NIOSH health hazard evaluation summary report.²⁴ Exposure and health
2 symptoms data²⁵ and additional analysis of injury and survey data also are available.²⁶

3 These findings apply only to acute exposures during the clean up phase. In order to examine
4 potential long-term effects of exposure in clean-up workers and volunteers, the National Institute of
5 Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) launched the GuLF STUDY (Gulf Long-term Follow-up
6 Study) in February 2011. The study, which is enrolling up to 55,000 individuals, is expected to take
7 10 years and will be linked with various exposure scenarios based on area, job or task, date,
8 geographic location and degree of exposure to weathered oil. The lapse in time between the start of
9 the study and the activities of the response workers limits the use of comparative biologic markers
10 of exposure and also may adversely affect recall accuracy.²⁷ Little evidence exists to support a
11 significant effect of chemical exposure from the oil spill on the general health of community
12 residents.²⁷

13 14 *Mental Health*

15
16 Previous oil spills and disasters have shown that affected populations experience mental health
17 effects that can be widespread and significant.^{28,29} Evaluating mental health consequences of the
18 Gulf oil spill is complicated by the fact that many areas were still recovering from Hurricane
19 Katrina and coastal populations included those already suffering from a higher incidence of health
20 disparities and poor health indices.²⁷

21
22 In the first several months after the spill, one-third of inhabitants of Gulf coast counties suffered
23 loss of income coupled with rates of depression, anxiety, and negative quality of life indicators that
24 exceeded baseline levels.³⁰ Such responses were significantly correlated with loss of income.³¹ A
25 cross-sectional survey of more than 2500 Gulf coast residents revealed they were more likely than
26 inland residents to score worse on the Emotional Health Index and to report a clinical diagnosis of
27 depression.³² A follow-up survey two years later indicated that residents of Gulf coast-facing
28 counties were 31% more likely to report having ever been diagnosed with depression in the first
29 four months of 2012 than they were in the same time period before the oil spill, although some
30 improvements were noted in general reports of stress, worry, and sadness.³³ Finally, nearly 20% of
31 parents reported that a child in the family had experienced emotional or behavioral problems
32 following the oil spill that were not previously existent.³⁴ Further information will be forthcoming
33 from the Women and their Children's Health (WATCH) Study. WATCH is a prospective cohort
34 study of the physical, mental and community health effects resulting from the spill and its
35 aftermath among women and their children in seven coastal Louisiana parishes closest to the oil
36 spill.

37 38 **ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS**

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40 Wide-ranging areas of the Gulf of Mexico were contaminated with oil including deep sea
41 communities and ~1600 kilometers of shoreline. Multiple species of marine life and birds were
42 affected. In addition to EPA dispersant testing, several large scale field efforts were performed
43 including subsea plume and post spill assessments, shoreline and wildlife oiling impact
44 assessments, and assessments of near coastal areas and estuaries (see Barron for review).³⁵
45 Accordingly, hydrocarbon footprints in near shore coastal sediments and salt marshes have been
46 characterized, and the direct effects of oil and dispersants on microbial and insect communities,
47 vegetation, and various aquatic species have been examined (see Symposium for review).³⁶
48 Potential effects of the oil spill on food webs and lower trophic ecosystems of the open ocean also
49 have received attention.³⁶ The relationship of myriad *in vitro* experiments indicating potential

1 harmful effects to real world phenomena remain uncertain but reinforce the need for continued
2 vigilance.

3 COMMENT

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5 Environmental, aquatic and coastal habitats, human health, social, and economic impacts are still
6 being documented and evaluated as part of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA)³⁷
7 and the Gulf Long Term Follow-up Study of the NIEHS. The NRDA is overseen by trustees from
8 the states of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida, the Department of the Interior
9 and the Department of Commerce. It will continue to assess damage to natural resources and the
10 public's access and use of those resources for many years and will also design and implement
11 restoration projects. Findings also will continue to emerge from the Gulf of Mexico Research
12 Initiative, a nonprofit organization that is disbursing \$500 million donated by BP to scientists over
13 10 years. These peer-reviewed grants cover a wide range of topics including public health effects
14 of the oil spill. The first interdisciplinary conference was held in January 2013.³⁶ Uncertainty
15 remains about the potential for bioaccumulation of harmful residues. Accordingly, the overall
16 impact of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill including human health effects, remains to be
17 determined, but resources and mechanisms are in place to conduct long term assessments and
18 remediation efforts.

19

20 RECOMMENDATIONS

21

22 The Council on Science and Public Health recommends that the following statements be adopted
23 and the remainder of the report be filed.

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25 1. That Policy D-135.980, "Gulf Oil Spill Health Risks: Update on AMA Involvement" be
26 amended to read as follows.

27

28 Our AMA will encourage the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences and the
29 Natural Resource Damage Assessment program to: (1) continue to monitor health effects
30 (including mental health effects) and public health surveillance activities related to the Gulf
31 oil spill, and provide relevant information and resources as they become available; and (2)
32 monitor report back at the 2013 Annual Meeting on the results of studies examining the
33 health effects of the Gulf oil spill, and provide. (Modify Current HOD Policy)

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35 2. That Policy D-135.980 be renamed as follows:

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37 Gulf Oil Spill Health Risks and Effects (Modify Current HOD Policy)

Fiscal note: Less than \$500

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