Do Not Resuscitate Order

• In re: K.I.

In re: K.I., 735 A.2d 448(D.C. Ct. App. 1999)

K.I. was born prematurely with cerebral palsy, sepsis, and other serious medical problems.  She required continuous, acute medical care.  Her physicians evaluated her cognitive functioning as “virtually non-existent,” with no hope of improvement.  She could neither hear nor see, but she did experience pain, such as that attendant to an extraordinary resuscitation effort.  Her physicians recommended that a do not resuscitate order be entered, since the quality of her life was minimal but the pain to her of prolonging that life would be substantial.

KI’s mother had been adjudicated as neglectful.  However, as her biological parent, she objected to the DNR order and stated that she wanted everything done for her child in the event of a medical emergency.  Her position was that “any amount of pain is worth it as long as she breathes.”  One of two men may have been KI’s father; the trial evidence did not show the results of a paternity test.  One of the putative fathers agreed with KI’s mother and opposed the DNR order.  The other putative father agreed with the experts that the court should authorize a DNR order.

The trial court ordered that, in the event of cardiac and/or pulmonary arrest, KI’s attending physicians could perform only non-invasive means of resuscitation.  The biological mother appealed.

The Medical Society of the District of Columbia, in an amicus brief joined by the Litigation Center, argued that under CEJA Opinions E-2.035, E-2.20, and E-2.215, the trial court had weighed the relevant factors correctly and should be affirmed.

The Court of Appeals adopted many of amici’s arguments and affirmed.